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We report characteristics of the early stage of the pandemic (H1N1) 
2009 in Germany. Until 16 June 2009, 198 confirmed cases were 
notified. Almost half of the cases (47%) were imported, mostly from 
Mexico and the United States. About two thirds of indigenous cases 
were outbreak-related (with two large school-associated outbreaks, 
n=74). According to our results Germany is still in the early stage 
of the pandemic with limited domestic transmission.
Introduction 
After identification of the first cases in April 2009, the rapid 
spread of the new influenza A(H1N1)v pandemic is a clear signal 
that global spread of this new virus is inevitable. Within six weeks 
the novel influenza A(H1N1)v virus has spread as far as previous 
pandemic influenza viruses have spread within six months [1]. 
As of 15 July, the European Centre for Disease Prevention 
and Control (ECDC) reported 125,993 confirmed human cases 
worldwide from 129 countries with a total of 667 deaths. Most 
deaths occurred by far in the United States (n=211), Argentina 
(n=137) and Mexico (n=124) [2]. 
The first German case was notified on 27 April 2009. However, 
the dynamics of the unfolding pandemic in Germany and the rest 
of Europe differed markedly from that of North America.
We present data reported during the first two months including 
cases notified until 16 June 2009. The information is therefore 
focussed on the characteristics of the early stage of the evolving 
pandemic in Germany.
Methods
Immediately after the first cases in the United States became 
public the Robert Koch Institute (RKI) established a case-based 
reporting of influenza A(H1N1)v. Information on possible, probable 
and confirmed cases was collected in a database.
A possible case was defined as a person with febrile 
(>=38o C) respiratory illness and with (a) an epidemiological link to 
a country with domestic transmission or (b) contact to a probable or 
confirmed case, (c) residence in a county or region with at least five 
cases that had no epidemiological link to a country with domestic 
transmission or a confirmed case or (d) laboratory exposure. 
A probable case was defined as a person with a laboratory 
diagnosis of influenza A with a negative test result for seasonal 
influenza (A/H1 and A/H3). 
A confirmed case was defined as a person who had a sample 
positive for influenza A(H1N1)v virus confirmed by the National 
Reference Laboratory (NRL) or by a laboratory approved for 
surveillance by the NRL. 
A case was considered as imported if the date of onset of 
symptoms was within seven days after departure from a country 
with sustained community-level transmission. By 16 June 2009 
according to the definition of the Robert Koch Institute this included: 
Argentina, Australia, Chile, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Honduras, 
Israel, Canada, Mexico, New Zeeland, Panama, Singapore, Spain, 
United Kingdom, Uruguay and the United States. If no recent travel 
history to one of these countries fulfilling the RKI definition at the 
time of travel was reported, the case was considered as indigenous.
For laboratory-confirmed cases (self-) isolation was recommended 
(adults: for seven days, children: for 10 days after onset of 
symptoms)
Contact management in the early phase was as follows: 
All contacts of confirmed and probable cases were registered 
at local health authorities and informed about pandemic influenza 
(H1N1). Contacts were classified in two categories: 1) close 
contacts (e.g. household contact or sexual partner or unprotected 
person involved in patient care or treatment) and 2) repeated casual 
contacts (including conversation and physical contact). 
Measures for close contacts included home quarantine for seven 
days after the last relevant contact, daily health monitoring by 
local health authorities and consideration of antiviral prophylaxis 
for 10 days. Less close contacts were advised to reduce contact to 
vulnerable persons for seven days.
Results
As of 16 June 2009, 198 laboratory confirmed cases of influenza 
A(H1N1)v have been detected in Germany (Figure 1).
Of the 190 confirmed cases, for whom the sex was reported, 
110 (58%) were female. Cases ranged in age from 1 to 67 years, 
with an average of 23 years and a median of 18 years (Figure 2). 
The majority of the female cases in the age-group 10-19 years 
can be explained by the high number of infected girls associated 
with a school outbreak, where 70% of students in the two affected 
classes were female. 
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The confirmed cases were distributed over 14 districts 
(Figure 3).
While in the beginning most cases were imported, the proportion 
of indigenous cases has increased since 2 June 2009 (Figure 1). 
Overall 93 cases (47%) were imported. 
The most frequently involved countries were: United States 
with 77 cases (83%), Mexico with 10 (11%), Argentina with three 
(3%) and United Kingdom, Canada and Panama with one case 
each (total 3%).  
105 domestic cases (53%) were notified. Amongst these the 
source of the infection was known in 96 cases (91%). Out of these 
96 cases 73 (76%) were outbreak-related and 23 related to an 
imported case (20 secondary cases=direct contact to an imported 
case, and 3 tertiary cases=direct contact to a secondary case). 
The infections of these 96 cases were most likely acquired in the 
following settings: school (73 cases), family/household (8), private 
party (6), healthcare (3), child care centre (3) and unknown (3).
For nine cases notified in June that were not restricted to a 
certain area the source of infection was unknown, i.e. the case did 
not report any travel history or contact to a confirmed case and was 
not part of an outbreak.
Four larger outbreaks (≥ 5 cases) have been identified: one 
outbreak associated with a child care centre (5 cases), one outbreak 
following a private party (6 cases) and two recent outbreaks related 
to two schools in North Rhine-Westphalia (16 and 58 confirmed 
cases so far).  
The clinical features of the confirmed cases are shown in Figure 
4. In 29% of all confirmed cases information about symptoms 
was not (yet) available. Asymptomatic infection occurred in 3% 
of cases. 
Reliable information on comorbidities is only available for a 
limited number of cases, who have been followed up intensively. 
Among 18 of these cases four reported underlying medical 
conditions including metastasising carcinoid, arterial hypertension, 
hypothyroidism and chronic respiratory disease. 
Hospitalisation was reported for 40 cases (20%), the reasons 
were primarily infection control measures, not disease severity. 
Detailed information on the severity of the infection is pending, 
but up to 16 June 2009 no case was known to require mechanical 
ventilation and no deaths were been reported.
Data on vaccination status was available for 49% of confirmed 
cases. Of these, 11% (n=11) had a history of vaccination with 
seasonal influenza vaccine. 
In 55% of cases information on contacts ascertained by the local 
health authorities was available. The mean number of contacts 
per case was five (range 0-291). The type of contact and applied 
infection control measures are currently under investigation.  
For those cases (n=22) that have been followed up intensively 
the number of contacts who acquired influenza A(H1N1)v 
infection was calculated per case. Seven contacts had a PCR-
confirmed infection, corresponding to 0.3 infected contacts 
per case. None of the symptomatic contacts with a confirmed 
infection had received timely antiviral prophylaxis. This calculation 
was performed for cases notified before 4 June 2009. With an 
increasing number of indigenous cases and the occurrence of larger 
outbreaks this ratio is now expected to increase considerably. 
Discussion
The characteristics of cases in the beginning of the pandemic 
closely resemble the data presented by other European 
countries (e.g. United Kingdom [3]) and Japan [4] in the early 
phase of the pandemic. 
The majority of cases in the beginning were imported from 
Mexico and the United States. Strategies for early detection and 
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influenza A(H1N1)v, Germany, as of 16 June 2009 (n=183)*




















F i g u r e  1
Laboratory-confirmed cases of influenza A(H1N1)v by date 
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Geographical distribution of laboratory-confirmed cases of influenza A(H1N1)v, Germany, as of 16 June 2009 (n=198)
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management of these cases seemed to work in this stage as no 
recommendations for travel restriction were in place. In the time 
period described Germany did not experience an exploding number 
of cases, however this might not only be due to the effect of the 
control measures taken but also due to other factors [5].
According to our results the first two months represented the 
early stage of the pandemic in Germany characterised by a high 
proportion of cases being imported, short chain of infections and 
limited outbreaks within the general population. The number of 
cases showed a rapid incline since mid-July 2009 with 7,963 
confirmed cases notified until 5 August 2009 (of these, 6,259 
cases (79%) were imported). However the overall picture has not 
changed considerably since 16 June since the recent increase is 
mainly due to travellers, in part German high-school graduates, 
returning from Spain and UK.
Due to the increasing case numbers the surveillance system has 
by now been changed from reporting of suspected cases individually 
by fax to the routine case-based electronic notification to the state 
and national level of laboratory-confirmed cases and cases with an 
epidemiological link to a laboratory-confirmed case.
Taking into account the mildness of symptoms in the majority 
of cases the strategy for contact management has been adapted 
recently. Only close contacts (definition as above) with either a) 
an increased risk of severe infection (e.g. immunocompromised 
or chronic ill patients or pregnant women or infants) or b) with 
close contacts to vulnerable groups or with a high risk of causing 
outbreaks (e.g. in schools) are being followed up. The adapted 
measures are now focused on close contacts.
Furthermore, information on hospitalisation, treatment and risk 
groups are collected through the electronic notification system as 
with an increasing number of cases the burden of disease and 
severity of the clinical presentation becomes the main focus of 
the monitoring.
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Clinical presentation of laboratory-confirmed cases of 
influenza A(H1N1)v, Germany, as of 16 June 2009 (n=140)*
*Note: Data on symptoms was unavailable for 58 cases
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